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This study aims to test the agency theory in privatized Indonesian State-Owned 
Enterprises. The agency problem in this study was proxied by firm value 
(Tobin's Q) while the agency problem control mechanism was proxied by 
institutional ownership, leverage, and dividend policy. This study examines 
the interchangeable relations between the three variables. The data used in this 
study are secondary data sourced from the Indonesia Stock Exchange. The 
research sample is all SOEcompanies that meet the criteria and are listed on 
the Indonesia Stock Exchange in the 2013-2017 observation period. The 
analytical tool used in this study was 2SLS (Two-Stage Least Square) with 
panel data techniques and simultaneous models. The results showed that 
dividend policy and institutional ownership have a substitution relationship in 
reducing agency problems, whereas leverage and dividend policy, as well as 
institutional ownership and leverage, do not have a substitute relationship in 
reducing agency problems. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Nowadays, several SOEs have been privatized, one of the aims is to control agency problems through a share 
ownership structure. According to Law Number 19 of 2003 concerning State-Owned Enterprises, privatization is the 
sale of shares of a state-owned enterprise which is a limited liability company with shares of at least 51% owned by 
the Republic of Indonesia, either partially or wholly to other parties in order to improve performance and the firm 
value, enlarging the benefits for the country and society, and expanding community ownership of shares. 
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The conversion of part of government ownership into public ownership has led to oversight of SOE performance 
not only by the government but also by the public, especially investors (Ayu, 2018). More optimal oversight is expected 
to be able to control the actions of managers to suit the interests of shareholders (Uwugibe, 2013). According to 
Aprilina (2013), privatization carried out by SOEs will change the SOEs culture, so that SOEs truly concentrate on 
achieving their main mission of maximizing shareholder wealth. The increase in shareholders' wealth shows an 
increase in the welfare of shareholders which has an impact on increasing the firm value. 
In Indonesia, the ownership of SOEs shares that go public is mostly owned by institutions such as banks, consumer 
finance companies, leasing companies, insurance companies, investment companies, mutual fund companies, and 
pension fund companies. Institutional shareholders become monitoring agents, which means that supervisory activities 
previously carried out by the principal and incurring monitoring costs can be reduced, so this study uses institutional 
ownership as an indicator of ownership structure. 
The amount of cash available in the company makes managers often use the cash to finance projects that benefit 
managers so that dividend policy can be a control mechanism for the emergence of agency problems because it reduces 
the cash flow that is in manager's control (Rozeff, 1982 & Easterbrook, 1984). Dividend policy can be seen from the 
calculation of dividend payout ratio which is the amount of dividend paid by the company compared to the company's 
profit. Dividend payments cause the company's free cash flow under the control of managers to reduce opportunities 
for managers to make extravagance through expenditures that are not beneficial to improving the welfare of 
shareholders and will affect the decrease in agency costs, namely residual loss (Iryanto & Wahyudi, 2010). High 
dividend payments can also be a positive signal for investors to increase firm value (Osamwonyi & Lola-Ebueku, 
2016). 
Just like dividend payments, increased use of debt will encourage managers to act in a disciplined manner providing 
future cash flow for debt and interest payments which causes the company's free cash flow under manager's control to 
decrease (Jensen, 1986). The level of debt used in a company is calculated using a leverage ratio by measuring the 
number of assets that are credited by creditors so that creditors will increase supervision of managers and supervisory 
activities previously carried out by the principal and lead to reduced monitoring costs. 
Based on this, the dividend policy, leverage, and institutional ownership have the same function, namely as a 
mechanism to control agency problems in privatized SOEs. Therefore, the three mechanisms should have a mutually 
replacing relationship. This means that one mechanism can replace the other mechanism in controlling agency 
problems which are reflected in the firm value. The mutually changing relationship is reflected in the significant 
negative relationship between the three mechanisms. 
There are still different research results regarding the relationship between the three control mechanisms. Research 
by Asad & Yousaf (2014), found that the high use of debt will reduce the level of dividend payments because profit 
distribution is prioritized to pay off debt rather than being paid as dividends. A similar case was also stated by Uwuigbe 
(2013), that companies with high financial leverage tend to pay lower dividends. Research conducted by Rahma & 
Anisb (2017), found that there was no significant relationship between leverage and dividend policy. According to the 
results of research conducted by Javeed et al., (2017), there is a significant relationship between leverage and firm 
value which is moderated by the structure of scattered ownership, meaning that the structure of scattered ownership 
reinforces the increase in firm value. The greater portion of institutional investor ownership will also reduce the level 
of dividend distribution (Al-Qahtani & Ajina, 2017; Yanti & Dwirandra, 2019; Putri & Sujana, 2018). The results of 
the study by Olufawoye et al., (2017), precisely states that the supervision by the shareholders is spread does not 
significantly affect the distribution of dividends (Olufawoye et al., 2017). Similar to the results of Vo & Nguyen 
(2014), which found that ownership structure, dividend policy, and partial leverage had no significant effect. Sari 
(2016), found that there is a mutually changing relationship between leverage and dividend policy and leverage with 
ownership structures as a mechanism for controlling agency problems. Meanwhile, research by Hardjopranoto (2006), 
concluded that the interlocking relationship between the three dividend policies, leverage, and ownership structure in 
the role of oversight of agency problems did not fully occur. This then raises the research gap research. 
 
Literature Review and Hypothesis 
 
According to Brigham & Daves (2016), an increase in debt is interpreted by outsiders about the company's ability 
to pay obligations in the future or low business risk, this will be responded positively by the market. Research by Harris 
& Raviv (1990), which states that leverage positively affects firm value. The share of scattered share ownership will 
encourage increased oversight that is more optimal for the company's management performance (Uwuigbe, 2013). 
Increased supervision by institutions results in an optimal performance of the company being monitored and avoided 
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opportunistic behavior so that managers will act in accordance with the wishes of shareholders. Large institutional 
ownership will carry out active supervision so that managers direct all policies and efforts to maximize firm value 
(Sari, 2016). 
From a company perspective, institutional ownership can reduce agency conflicts. When the company is owned by 
an institution, the company will be controlled externally so that the company prioritizes long-term interests, for 
example, if the company decides to pay dividends then this happens if the company has already made an investment 
and improved the company's performance so that the remaining funds are used to pay dividends. This is supported by 
the results of research by Al-Qahtani & Ajina (2017) that there is a negative relationship between institutional investor 
ownership and the level of dividend distribution. Research by Putri & Nasir (2006) & Aghara et al., (2018), suggests 
the results that high dividend payments will reduce agency costs so that the existence of institutions as a monitoring 
mechanism is no longer needed. 
The mutually changing relationship is reflected by a significant negative relationship between the two variables. 
This means that one machine can replace the other mechanism in controlling agency problems which are reflected in 
the firm value. Rahma & Anisb (2017), found a substitution relationship between dividend and debt policies. Likewise 
with Vo & Nguyen (2014), which states that dividend payments have a negative impact on leverage. A negative effect 
was also found by Sisca (2008). He stated that the higher the debt policy, the lower the dividend policy. If the company 
has a high level of debt, then the company is trying to reduce the agency cost of debt by reducing its debt. Debt 
reduction can be done by financing investments with internal funding sources so that shareholders will give up their 
dividends to finance their investments. 
The mutually changing relationship is reflected by a significant negative relationship between the two variables. 
This means that one machine can replace the other mechanism in controlling agency problems which are reflected in 
the firm value. The results of the study by Hardjopranoto (2006), state that there is a negative relationship between 
institutional ownership and leverage policy. Likewise with research by Vo & Nguyen (2014), that institutional 
ownership negatively affects leverage. The results of this study are consistent with Rahma & Anisb (2017), research 
which shows that companies with institutional and personal ownership will payout low dividends and use debt at low 
levels. While Mukonyi et al., (2014), stated that there was a statistically significant negative relationship between 
institutional, personal, and foreign ownership of corporate leverage. 
 
Hypothesis 
 
H1:  There is a significant simultaneous effect between dividend policy, leverage, and institutional ownership on the 
value of privatized Indonesian SOEs 
H2:  There is a mutually changing relationship between dividend policy and institutional ownership as an agency 
problem control mechanism for privatized Indonesian SOEs 
H3:  There is a mutually changing relationship between dividend policy and leverage as an agency problem control 
mechanism for privatized Indonesian SOEs 
H4:  There is a mutually changing relationship between leverage and institutional ownership as a mechanism for 
controlling agency problems in privatized Indonesian SOEs 
 
 
2.  Materials and Methods 
 
This type of research is causality research that aims to explain the relationship between two or more variables 
quantitatively through hypothesis testing. While the research approach used is quantitative research, namely the 
research procedures that produce research data in the form of statistical figures that will be used as material for analysis. 
The scope of the research includes the object of research, namely firm value, and three agency problem control 
mechanisms, namely dividend policy, leverage, and institutional ownership which are limited to state-owned 
enterprises that have privatized and listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange for five years, from 2013 to 2017. 
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3.  Results and Discussions 
 
3.1 Result 
Table 1 
Regression Result of institutional ownership, dividend policy, and leverage on firm value 
 
Dependent Variable: 
Firm Value 
Coefficient Standard Error Probability 
Constanta 2,008916 0,087820 0,0000 
Institutional Ownership 2,995046 0,239470 0,0000 
Leverage -2,409548 0,046140 0,0000 
Dividend Policy -0,309133 0,029759 0,0000 
F-statistic (Prob.) 1.028,667 (0,000000) 
R-square 0,976560 
Primary Data, 2019 
 
Based on Table 1, the results show that the F-statistic value of 0.000000 is smaller than the 0.05 significance level, 
meaning that institutional ownership, dividend policy, and leverage simultaneously have a significant effect on the 
value of the company which is proxied by Tobin's Q ratio at 5% alpha with business risk, company size, fixed asset 
structure, and share growth as control variables. Institutional ownership has a significant positive relationship to firm 
value with a regression coefficient of 2.995046 which means that each increase in 1 unit of institutional ownership will 
increase the value of the company by 2.995046 units assuming other variables are constant. Leverage has a significant 
negative relationship to the value of the company with a regression coefficient of -2.409548 which means that each 
increase in the leverage level of 1 unit will reduce the value of the company by 2.409548 units assuming other variables 
are constant. Dividend policy has a significant negative relationship to firm value with a regression coefficient of -
0.309133 which means that every 1 unit increase in the dividend policy rate will decrease the value of the company by 
0.309133 units assuming other variables are constant. 
 
Table 2 
Regression result of dividend policy and institutional ownership 
 
Dependent Variable: 
Institutional Ownership 
Coefficient Standard Error Probability 
Constanta 0,364393 0,021539 0,0000 
Leverage -0,034156 0,026542 0,2023 
Dividend Policy -0,060847 0,020208 0,0036 
F-statistic (Prob.) 8,498402 (0,000486) 
  Primary Data, 2019 
 
Based on Table 2, the results show that the F-statistic value of 0,000486 is smaller than the significance level of 0.05, 
meaning that dividend policy and leverage simultaneously have a significant effect on institutional ownership. 
Dividend policy partially has a significant negative effect on institutional ownership at alpha 5% with business risk, 
company size, fixed asset structure, and growth stock as control variables. The regression coefficient of -0.060847 
means that each increase in the dividend policy rate of 1 unit will reduce the level of institutional ownership by 
0.060847 units. 
 
Table 3 
 Regression Result of Dividend Policy and Leverage 
 
Dependent Variable: 
Dividend Policy 
Coefficient Standard Error Probability 
Constanta -0,036999 0,347751 0,9156 
Leverage 0,002184 0,182719 0,9905 
Institutional Ownership 0,806466 0,943557 0,3955 
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F-statistic (Prob.) 0,366898 (0,694168) 
   Primary Data, 2019 
 
Based on Table 3, the results show that the F-statistic value of 0.694168 is greater than the 0.05 significance level, 
meaning that leverage has no significant effect on dividend policy with business risk, company size, fixed asset 
structure, and stock growth as control variables. 
 
Tabel 4 
Regression Result of Leverage and Institutional Ownership 
 
Dependent Variable: 
Leverage 
Coefficient Standard Error Probability 
Constanta 0,895314 0,361031 0,0155 
Institutional Ownership -0,355119 1,134083 0,7551 
Dividend Policy -0,001132 0,082220 0,9891 
F-statistic (Prob.) 0,058546 (0,943179) 
    Primary Data, 2019 
 
Based on Table 4, the results show that the F-statistic value of 0.943179 is greater than the 0.05 significance level, 
meaning that institutional ownership has no significant effect on leverage with business risk, company size, fixed asset 
structure, and stock growth as control variables. 
 
3.2 Discussion 
 
Based on Table 1, the results show that institutional ownership, dividend policy, and leverage simultaneously have 
a significant effect on the firm value which is proxied by Tobin's Q ratio at 5% alpha. It can be seen that institutional 
ownership has a significant positive relationship to the firm value which indicates that the higher the level of 
institutional ownership of the company, the value of the company will increase. An increase in institutional ownership 
results in managers avoiding opportunistic behavior because the manager's performance is monitored optimally to 
achieve shareholder goals, namely increasing the value of the company, so as to reduce agency problems. 
It can also be seen that leverage has a significant negative relationship to company value, which indicates that the 
lower the use of corporate debt, the value of the company will increase, and vice versa. After the optimal point, the use 
of debt will actually reduce the value of the company because the increase in profits from the use of debt is not 
proportional to the increase in the cost of financial distress and agency problems. 
The results also showed that the dividend policy had a significant negative relationship to the value of the company 
which showed that the lower the dividends distributed by the company, the higher the company's value, and vice versa. 
This can be caused by low dividends indicating that the ratio of retained earnings is high, this shows that the company's 
investment prospects in the future are good. 
Based on Table 2, the results show that the dividend policy has a significant negative effect on institutional 
ownership at alpha 5%, which shows that the dividend policy is a substitute for institutional ownership as a mechanism 
of controlling agency problems in a state-owned enterprise in Indonesia that privatize. The results of this study are 
consistent with research conducted by Jensen et al., (1999), who found a negative relationship with institutional 
ownership and dividend policy. From a company perspective, institutional ownership can reduce agency conflicts. 
When the company's shares are more institutionally owned, the company will be controlled externally so if the 
company decides to pay dividends, this will happen if the company has invested and improved the company's 
performance so that the remaining funds are used to pay dividends. This is supported by research results by Putri & 
Nasir (2006), which suggests that high dividend payments will reduce agency costs so that the existence of institutions 
as a monitoring mechanism is no longer needed. 
Based on Table 3, the results show that leverage does not have a significant effect on dividend policy, meaning that 
the high or low leverage of the company does not affect the dividend policy adopted by the company, which shows 
that the average Indonesian state-owned enterprise prefers internal funding policy first, namely retained earnings, then 
after that it uses debt and issues shares to meet its funding. This condition might cause that leverage does not have an 
impact on dividend policy during this research period. The results of this study differ from the results of research by 
Rahma & Anisb (2017); Vo & Nguyen (2014); Hommel (2011); and Sisca (2008), which state that the higher the debt 
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policy, the lower the dividend policy. But the results of this study are supported by research conducted by Fira (2009), 
which shows that leverage has no effect on dividend policy. 
Based on Table 4, the results show that institutional ownership does not have a significant effect on leverage, 
meaning that the level of company institutional ownership does not affect the level of corporate debt use. Unlike the 
results of research by Hardjopranoto (2006); Vo & Nguyen (2014); Rahma & Anisb (2017); and Mukonyi et al., 
(2014), which states that there is a statistically significant negative relationship between institutional ownership and 
corporate leverage. This study was supported by Sugama (2018) who obtained the result that institutional ownership 
had no effect on leverage. This can be caused by the highest proportion of shares ownership still owned by the 
government in accordance with regulations related to the privatization of Indonesian SOEs, which is a minimum of 
51% of total shares. The government is more inclined to emphasize the objectives or policies in the political and social 
fields, in other words, the benefits from the use of debt are not the main objectives of the current government. 
 
 
4.  Conclusion 
 
Simultaneous analysis of institutional ownership, leverage, and dividend policy related to mechanisms that can 
reduce agency problems. The separation between ownership and control of the company creates a conflict of interest 
between shareholders and managers who can pursue other objectives that are different from shareholders maximizing 
wealth. These results provide evidence of the mechanism for controlling the company through institutional ownership, 
dividend payments and also the use of leverage decided by the company. For shareholders, this research is expected to 
be a consideration for investors to see the condition of the company in terms of ownership structure, leverage, and 
dividends that are distributed and provide information about the actual condition of the company and used as a means 
of monitoring the company. For managers, this research is expected to be used as a material consideration in decision 
making which can then be used to improve the competitive advantage of a company. 
 
Research Limitations 
 
This research is inseparable from limitations due to constraints and conditions in several respects. The limitation 
of the research experienced by the author is that it only focuses on state-owned enterprise listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange that have distributed successive dividends for five years, namely from 2013 to 2017 so that there are only 
15 SOEs that match the criteria for determining the sample. It is expected that the limitations experienced by 
researchers can be considered for further research. 
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